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Abstract The semantic and pragmatic contribution of appositives to their con-
taining sentence is a subject of continuing debate. While unidimensional semantic
accounts propose that appositives contribute their truth conditions to their containing
sentence, multidimensional accounts predict that they do not. In three experiments,
we directly compared judgments of the truth of sentences containing appositives
and sentences containing conjunctions. Our findings contribute both a method-
ological and a theoretical point. First, we show that no conclusions about the
truth-conditional contributions of appositives can be drawn from experimental work
without further investigation of how participants provide truth value judgments for
complex sentences. Second, we show that while appositives appear to contribute
truth values to their containing sentences, participants are highly sensitive to task
features when they compute the truth value of sentences with appositives and also,
crucially, with conjunctions. Specifically, we show that both sentences containing
appositives and those containing conjunctions can be judged true even when the
appositive or one conjunct is patently false. We conclude that it is unlikely that these
results reflect semantic judgments, and suggest that they reflect truth only at the
speech-act level.
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1 Introduction
It is debated whether appositives, as expressing canonically not-at-issue content,
contribute truth conditions to their containing sentence. The debate largely centers
around the nature of the meaning that appositives contribute to their containing sen-
tence and to the discourse. Appositives contribute entailments, but also demonstrate
exceptional behavior compared to main clause content. For example, appositives
generally project and contribute new, but secondary, information in discourse (Potts
2005). These properties arguably explain intuitions that (1-b) is felt to be less false
* We are grateful to Adrian Brasoveanu, Pranav Anand, Donka Farkas, Jesse Harris, Dan Lassiter,
Kristen Syrett, Maziar Toosarvandani, Matt Wagers, and audiences at the California Meeting on
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than (1-a), and partially motivate proposals in which appositives compose seman-
tically separately from their containing sentence (Bach 1999; Dever 2001; Potts
2005).
(1) a. San Francisco is the capital of California and is north of San Diego.
b. San Francisco, which is the capital of California, is north of San Diego.
However, recent work reaffirms that the story is more complicated than merely posit-
ing that appositives compose in a separate semantic dimension. Amaral, Roberts
& Smith (2007) and Harris & Potts (2009), for example, show that appositives do
not always project. AnderBois, Brasoveanu & Henderson (2015) provide corpus
examples showing that appositives can integrate with main clause information at the
level of the discourse, and Syrett & Koev (2014) present experimental evidence that
appositives are evaluated as contributing their truth conditions to their containing
sentence. We follow up on these influential works in three experiments, which di-
rectly compared truth evaluations of sentences containing appositive relative clauses
and conjunctions.
1.1 Background
Appositives are one member of a broader class of constructions that generally
contribute not-at-issue content in a discourse. Not-at-issue content is an umbrella
term that encompasses a heterogeneous set of constructions, including appositives,
epithets, parentheticals, and presuppositions. There are several diagnostics that
characterize constructions contributing not-at-issue content; these diagnostics are
best thought of as a cluster of properties that characterize secondary information in
an utterance, and not as tests that correlate tightly with particular constructions.
Not-at-issueness is generally discussed as a property of a construction situated
within a discourse.1 One property of not-at-issue content is that it generally does
not contribute to resolving the current Question Under Discussion, or QuD, of the
discourse (Ginzburg 1996; Simons, Tonhauser, Beaver & Roberts 2010; Roberts
1996; Roberts 2012). For example, the appositive in (2) expresses information that
is secondary to the QuD, which is resolved, or answered, in the main clause.
(2) Q: What are the sailors doing?
A: The sailors, who see the coming storm, are sailing back into the harbor.
Not-at-issue content also generally projects past operators such as negation (Kart-
tunen 1973; Karttunen & Peters 1979; Beaver 2001; Kadmon 2001; Potts 2005;
1 Though see Potts (2005) for a view under which not-at-issueness is a property of particular semantic
constructions.
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Simons et al. 2010; Potts 2012). However, not all not-at-issue content projects in
the same manner. While presuppositions are generally blocked by ‘plugs’ such as
propositional attitude verbs (Karttunen 1973), appositives can (but do not always)
project beyond them (see e.g. Amaral et al. 2007; Harris & Potts 2009).
Potts (2005) influentially argued that appositives are part of a subset of not-
at-issue constructions called conventional implicatures. The classes of construc-
tions (including appositives, epithets, and honorifics) falling under the conventional
implicature label are unified by Potts at the level of their semantic composition:
conventional implicatures compose semantically independently from their contain-
ing sentence. Therefore, under the conventional implicature account, appositive
relative clauses compose semantically independently from main clause content, and
contribute a distinct proposition at the semantic level. This semantic independence
accounts for the projection properties of appositives, as well as observations that
appositives are inaccessible for binding from a main clause.
The overall picture of appositives is, however, complex. While they often exhibit
the properties of not-at-issue content, they are also able at times to integrate more
directly into the discourse. Potts (2005) observed that conventional implicatures act
similar to main-clause content for certain discourse-level behavior, such as serving as
the antecedent for inter-clausal anaphoric dependencies (see also Frazier & Clifton
2005 and Nouwen 2006) and establishing discourse referents (cf. Murray 2014).
Subsequent research has also shown that appositives can sometimes respond to a
QuD in the discourse and can embed under propositional attitude verbs (Amaral
et al. 2007; Harris & Potts 2009; Tonhauser 2012; Koev 2013; AnderBois et al.
2015; Kroll & Wagers 2017; a.o.). Such observations are captured in the account of
AnderBois et al. (2015), under which appositives and main clause content share a
semantic representation, but appositives differ from main clause content by directly
imposing their content on the discourse context set.
1.2 Current Study
The current study is indebted to the pioneering experimental work on appositives in
Syrett & Koev (2014). Syrett & Koev (2014)’s results add to a building consensus that
appositives are considered in the evaluation of sentential truth, that is, that appositives
contribute their truth conditions to their containing sentences. Syrett & Koev (2014)
found that participants overwhelmingly evaluated a sentence containing a false
appositive as false. Their findings motivate an account under which appositives
contribute their truth conditions to their containing sentence in a manner analogous
to at-issue content, e.g. conjunctions. However, under this account, appositives are
illocutionarily independent from main clause content, meaning that they contribute a
separate speech act from the rest of the sentence.
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We do not take exception to this account here. However, we argue that the truth-
evaluation results gathered by Syrett & Koev (2014), while insightful and influential,
do not themselves provide the empirical evidence needed to adjudicate in favor of or
against such an account. We show that no conclusions about the truth-conditional
contributions of appositives can be drawn from experimental work without further
investigation of how participants provide truth value judgments for complex sen-
tences. While we replicate Syrett & Koev (2014)’s results that appositives affect
the truth judgments of their containing sentences, we demonstrate that participants
are highly sensitive to task features when they compute the truth value of sentences
with appositives and also, crucially, with conjunctions. In particular, we show that
both sentences containing appositives and sentences containing conjunctions can
be judged true even when the appositive or one conjunct is patently false. Because
sentences with false conjuncts are judge true, it is unlikely that these results reflect
semantic judgments, and we argue that these results should not be used as evidence
for or against particular semantic analyses of appositives.
This paper presents the findings of three experiments that investigated the contri-
butions of appositive relative clauses and conjunctions to the truth of their containing
sentences. We hypothesized that judgments of truth and falsity would be affected
by clausal type, such that participants would be more willing to disregard false
appositives than false conjunctions in evaluations of truth. However, this hypothesis
was not supported by our findings. We show instead that clausal type did not affect
truth judgments; we found no evidence that sentences containing an appositive clause
and sentences containing a corresponding conjunct clause were treated differently in
truth judgments.
The experiments also investigated whether domain-general reasoning processes,
such as goal-oriented behavior, influenced truth evaluations in the experimental
setting. Our hypothesis was that judgments of truth and falsity would be affected by
the relevance of information to conversational goals, such that information relevant to
resolving a QuD would be prioritized over irrelevant information in truth evaluations.
This hypothesis was borne out. The relevance of clausal information did affect truth
judgments, such that relevant clauses – clauses whose information was relevant
to responding to a QuD – mattered more than irrelevant clauses – clauses whose
information was not relevant to responding to a QuD. These results suggest that
goal-oriented reasoning can cause participants to weigh different parts of a sentence
unequally in evaluations of sentential truth.
We conclude by arguing for the following specific point about appositives and a
more general point about the role of experimental evaluations of truth in semantic
theory. Our results show that truth judgments can be modulated by domain-general
or top-down processes, such as reasoning about conversational goals. Unless we
want to bake this behavior into our semantic truth-conditions – that is, unless we
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want to argue that the semantic truth-conditions of conjunctions can be affected
by the relevance of clausal material – then truth judgments of this nature do not
necessarily reflect semantic truth. Therefore, the experiments presented here should
not be used to adjudicate between competing theories of the semantic contribution
of appositive relative clauses. More broadly speaking, it therefore follows that
experimental judgments of truth as they are currently gathered are not always a good
guide to theoretical semantic predictions of truth.
2 Experiment 1
Experiment 1 replicated and expanded upon previous experimental work on truth
evaluations of appositives, notably those of Syrett & Koev (2014). Unlike previous
experimental investigations, we directly compared sentences containing appositives
with sentences containing analogous conjunctions. We also diverged from previous
investigations in using basic real-world knowledge of color and shape terms for
truth evaluations. Shapes were provided on the screen with target sentences, and
target sentences made true or false statements about those shapes based on color and
shape descriptors. Participants therefore had the evidence they needed to evaluate
the sentences locally.
Another novel feature of our experimental design was to include a context sen-
tence for each item. We reasoned that the inclusion of a context question was
important, because it allowed us more control over the information status of propo-
sitions in the experimental context. The context question gave participants a guide
to the local QuD, or goal, of the experimental context. Without such an explicit
QuD, participants may have attempted to reconstruct this information themselves.
Since we would have no way of knowing whether they had done so, or what their
conclusion(s) had been, we would have faced greater uncertainty in interpreting
their behavior without a preceding QuD than we did with one. In Experiment 1,
the context question was maximally general, and held the same across all items and
fillers: ‘What can you tell me about the shapes?’ This question was chosen so that
all information contained in the target sentences could be construed as relevant in
the experimental context.
In order to fully explore the behavior of sentences with appositives versus those
with conjunctions, we varied the truth of clausal information in target sentences so
that all possible combinations of truth and falsity were tested (see Table 1). When
both clauses in a sentence expressed information that was true, we hypothesized that
participants would evaluate the whole sentence as true. When both clauses expressed
false information, we expected participants to evaluate the whole sentence as false.
The interesting cases were those in which there was a mismatch in clausal truth, that
is, when one clause in a sentence expressed true information and the other clause
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expressed false information. If appositives do not contribute their truth conditions
to their containing sentence, or if their content is more easily disregarded, then
we expect that sentences containing a false appositive would be more likely to be
evaluated as true overall than sentences containing a false conjunction. If appositives
contribute their truth conditions to their containing sentence in a manner similar to
conjunctions, however, then we expect to see sentences with a false appositive and
sentences with a false conjunct evaluated as overall false at comparable rates.
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants
Forty-eight workers on Mechanical Turk participated in the experiment; all self-
identified as native English speakers. Completion of the survey took an average of
52 minutes. All participants were paid $7 for their participation.
2.1.2 Materials
Materials consisted of 80 experimental items comprising eight conditions. The
design was 2 x 2 x 2 with the factors clause type (Appositive or Conjunction), clause
1 truth (True or False), and clause 2 truth (True or False). Items were presented as
mini-dialogues on a single screen. Each item contained two shapes, the question
prompt ‘What can you tell me about the shapes?’, and the target sentence with the
options ‘True’ and ‘False’. As mentioned, a general context question was chosen in
order to ensure that all parts of the item sentences would be relevant to the question.
Target sentences consisted of two clauses in which the first clause was either an
appositive relative clause or a conjunct clause. If the first clause was an appositive,
then the second clause was a matrix clause; if the first clause was a conjunct, then
the second clause was also a conjunct clause. Examples of minimally different
appositive and conjunction conditions from one experimental item are given in Table
2. Each clause in the target sentences was manipulated to be true or false relative to
the shapes provided with the target sentence. An example of the appositive half of
an item is given in Table 1. Shapes varied across items, and item descriptions were
always basic shape or color terms that were unambiguously true or false relative to
the shapes displayed.
2.2 Procedure
The experiment was administered on Mechanic Turk and used the IbexFarm experi-
mental software (http://spellout.net/ibexfarm). Critical sentences were distributed
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Sentence Truth Value
The circle, which is hollow, is next to the blue triangle. TT
The circle, which is hollow, is next to the brown triangle. TF
The circle, which is filled, is next to the blue triangle. FT
The circle, which is filled, is next to the brown triangle. FF
Table 1 Appositive half of item from Experiment 1.
Clause Type Item
Appositive The circle, which is hollow, is next to the blue triangle.
Conjunction The circle is hollow and is next to the blue triangle.
Table 2 Appositive and conjunction conditions from one item in Experiment 1.
into eight Latin Square lists and were presented in pseudo-random order. The 80
experimental items were combined with 160 filler sentences. Fillers were designed
to mask the purpose of the experiment from participants. As such, they were coun-
terbalanced for clause type, shapes, positioning of shapes, and predicates. In order
to encourage participants to use the full range of the confidence scale, a combination
of common and uncommon shapes was used. Subjective predicates, such as scary,
were also included. The truth of fillers were balanced so that half of the experiment’s
trials were true.2
Each trial consisted of a mini-dialogue containing two shapes on the screen.
Below the shapes was the context question, and below the question was a declarative
sentence to be judged as “True” or “False.” Participants were instructed to judge the
sentence as either “True” or “False” by clicking on their choice or by using number
keys. Participants were given directions containing basic examples of truth or falsity
that used simple shapes and descriptions, e.g. the sentence ‘A star has 5 points’ is
True. They were instructed to read each mini-dialogue (trial) carefully, but to answer
based on their first impression of truth or falsity. After participants responded to
the truth judgment task, the screen advanced to showing a scale, and participants
were asked to rate their confidence about their truth judgment answer on a scale
from 1 (‘very unsure/unconfident’) to 5 (‘very sure/confident’). The screen also
automatically advanced to the confidence rating screen after 5500 milliseconds if no
2 Truth was, of course, subjective in some fillers and depended on the participants’ choice of including
appositive material. Truth was balanced in the items by assuming the inclusion of appositive content.
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answer was given within that time window for the True/False task. Participants were
told to rate their confidence as low if they were unsure of the truth or falsity of the
previous trial’s sentence. Four practice items were also given before the experiment
began to familiarize the participants with the task.
Participants were given two cartoon breaks 1/3 and 2/3 of the way through the
experiment. They were instructed that the experiment was paused at these points,
and to take a break if they wished. At the completion of the experiment, a debriefing
questionnaire and a short quiz testing color and shape competency were given.
2.3 Analysis
Truth judgment results were analyzed using a mixed-effects logistic regression
model fit by maximum likelihood. Fixed effects were clause type (Appositive vs.
Conjunction), clause 1 truth (True vs. False), clause 2 truth (True vs. False), and all
possible interactions among them. Following Barr, Levy, Scheepers & Tily (2013),
the maximal random effects structure, which included random slopes and intercepts
and correlations between them by Participant and Item, was used.
2.4 Results
Mean proportions of “True” judgments by clausal truth-value combinations are
given in Figure 1, along with 95% confidence intervals. We predicted that sentences
with a false appositive clause and a true second clause would be evaluated as
“True” at a greater rate than sentences with a false conjunct and a true second
clause. Counter to this prediction, we found no significant effect of clause type
or interaction of clause type and clause 1 truth, which would have indicated that
sentences with appositives were treated differently from those with conjuncts by
participants. Instead, participants were sensitive only to clausal falsity, evaluating
sentences with one or more false clauses as false overall. Sentences in which
both clauses were true were overwhelmingly evaluated as “True.” These results
were reflected in significant main effects of clause 1 truth, clause 2 truth, and an
interaction between the two (all ps < .001.). No other effects reached a significance
threshold of p < .05.
2.5 Discussion
Recall our hypothesis: if appositives do not contribute their truth conditions to their
containing sentence, or if their content is more easily disregarded, then sentences
containing a false appositive will be more likely to be evaluated as true overall than
sentences containing a false conjunction. However, if appositives contribute their
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Figure 1
Percentage of sentences evaluated “True” by truth value combination
and clause in Experiment 1. Error bars indicate 95% confidence inter-
vals.
truth conditions to their containing sentence in a manner similar to conjunctions,
then sentences with a false appositive and sentences with a false conjunct should
be judged “False” at comparable rates. With this hypothesis in mind, there are two
main observations to make about the results of Experiment 1. The first is that the
only sentences participants evaluated as “True” were those in which both clauses
expressed true information. This result demonstrates that any false clausal informa-
tion in the target sentences was sufficient for the whole sentence to be evaluated as
“False;” that is, participants responded in a manner consistent with the truth-table
for conjunctions. The second observation is that we found no significant difference
between sentences containing appositives and sentences containing conjunctions.
This result shows that sentences with conjunctions and sentences with appositives
were not treated differently, counter to what theories in which appositives have
exceptional truth-conditional behavior predict.
One concern that could be raised regarding these results is that the use of
a definite article in the target sentences results in a presupposition failure. The
concern, then, is that the false information is not in fact false, but is merely a
presupposition failure leading to undefinedness (Frege 1892; Strawson 1950; cf.
Russell 1905). There are two main reasons why we argue that this does not change
our interpretations of the results. The first reason is that theoretical predictions of the
differences between falsity and presupposition failure hold that people should be less
likely to evaluate presupposition failures as false, or they should be less confident
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in evaluating a presupposition failure as false. We would therefore expect one, or
possibly two, things to hold if this concern affected the current results: sentences
with a presupposition failure should not be evaluated as “False,” or they should be
evaluated as “False,” but with low confidence. However, neither of these outcomes
held in our results. Sentences with one false clause were overwhelmingly evaluated
as “False,” regardless of whether the false information was contained in a definite
description, as shown in Figure 1.3 As shown in Table 1, the false information
in the False-True condition did not contain a definite description, while the false
information in the True-False condition did contain a definite description. Despite
the presuppositional differences between the two clauses, we found no difference in
how the two clauses were evaluated.
Theoretical views under which presupposition failures would affect the current
results also predict that participants would be less confident of evaluating sentences
with presupposition failures as false. However, Figure 2 shows that participants were
in fact very highly confident of their evaluations in each condition. We therefore
found no evidence that our results are confounded by the use of a definite description
in the second clause. Instead, our results fit neatly into a growing body of theoretical
and experimental work on the presuppositions of definite descriptions that show that
multiple factors, such as topicality and verifiability, affect intuitions of truth and
falsity. We refer the interested reader to these works (Strawson 1964; Lasersohn
1993; von Fintel 2004; Schoubye 2010; Abrusán & Szendro˝i 2013; Schwarz 2014;
Schwarz 2015).
Another question that could be raised at this point is whether the decision to
have a forced-choice task, in which participants must choose either True or False for
each sentence, could have affected our findings and therefore our conclusions about
the experiment. For example, we could have chosen to give participants a scale of
truth and asked them to rate sentences in that manner. While both options are valid
methodologies, we do not believe our choice of methodology has influenced our
conclusions in any interesting way. Previous studies have shown that providing a
forced-choice task with a confidence rating yields the same results as presenting a
single scalar task (Macmillan & Creelman 1991). Furthermore, Syrett & Koev (2014)
used a scalar truth task in their Experiment 5, and found that participants judged
sentences with false appositives at the False-most end of the scale. Because previous
studies have shown equivalency between the two types of task, and because we
replicated Syrett & Koev (2014)’s results in which a scale of Truth/Falsity was used,
we argue that our particular choice of methodology has not affected our conclusions
in any interesting or notable way.
3 Note that while the means are not at 0% True, they are at what is reasonably considered to be floor.
Completely categorical results are rarely if ever collected in experimental settings, due to individual
variation and trial errors.
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Figure 2
Mean confidence ratings for Experiment 1 by truth value combination
and clause. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
3 Experiment 2
In Section 1 we noted that appositives, as canonically contributing not-at-issue
content, generally do not contain information relevant to resolving the current QuD.
In Experiment 1, we used a general QuD such that both clauses in the experimental
items could be construed as containing relevant information. However, this type
of general QuD may have encouraged participants to consider appositive content
in their evaluation of the sentences’ truth or falsity. In Experiment 2, we used a
specific QuD that targeted only information in the second clause of the experimental
items. Therefore, only the matrix clauses/2nd conjuncts had information that could
be construed as relevant to answering the QuD. Our hypothesis was that a specific
QuD would encourage participants to disregard the irrelevant appositive content in
their evaluations of sentential truth and falsity.
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Participants
Forty-eight workers on Mechanical Turk participated in the experiment; all self-
identified as native English speakers. Completion of the survey took an average of
50 minutes. All participants were paid $7 for their participation.
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What color is the circle?
Sentence Truth Value
The circle, which is next to the blue triangle, is green. TT
The circle, which is next to the blue triangle, is brown. TF
The circle, which is next to the pink triangle, is green. FT
The circle, which is next to the pink triangle, is brown. FF
Table 3 Appositive partial item from Experiment 2 with specific question tar-
geting matrix clause content.
3.1.2 Materials
The materials for Experiment 2 were the same as the materials for Experiment 1;
however, instead of the single question prompt ‘What can you tell me about the
shapes?’, each item had a different question. The questions in Experiment 2 targeted
only the information given in the second clause of the target sentences, which is the
matrix clause in the appositive conditions and the second conjunct in the conjunction
conditions. A partial item is given in Table 3. Questions in the fillers included a
balanced mix of general and specific questions that targeted different information in
the filler sentences. This variation was included so that participants could not learn
which information the question was going to target, or, conversely, where they could
find the information relevant to the QuD in the sentences.
3.2 Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 2 was identical to that for Experiment 1.
3.3 Analysis
Truth judgment results were analyzed in the same way as those for Experiment 1,
except that the random effects structure included only uncorrelated random slopes
and intercepts by Participant and Item.
3.4 Results
Mean proportions of “True” judgments by clausal truth-value combinations are given
in Figure 3, along with 95% confidence intervals. For Experiment 2, we predicted
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Figure 3
Percentage of sentences evaluated “True” by truth value combination
and clause in Experiment 2. Error bars indicate 95% confidence inter-
vals.
that the specific QuD in the experimental context would encourage participants to
disregard false appositives at a greater rate than in Experiment 1, leading to more
sentences being evaluated as true when the sentence contained a false appositive but
a true main clause. This hypothesis is borne out in the results. As shown in Figure 3,
the False-True appositive condition sentences were judged “True” at a mean rate of
53%, up from 8% for Experiment 1. However, the False-True conjunction condition
sentences were similarly judged “True” at a mean rate of 49%, up from 2% for
Experiment 1. This finding for the conjunction condition was not predicted. The
increase in the number of sentences evaluated as “True” in the False-True condition
in both the appositive and conjunction conditions is reflected in our failure to find
any statistically significant differences between the two clause types. In each truth
value combination, sentences with an appositive first clause and sentences with a
conjunct first clause patterned together.
These results were reflected in a significant main effect of clause 2 truth and an
interaction between the clause 1 truth and clause 2 truth (both ps < .001.). No other
effects reached a significance threshold of p < .05.
3.5 Discussion
We hypothesized that a specific QuD targeting only the second clause in the target
items would encourage participants to disregard the irrelevant appositive information.
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There are two main things to notice in the results in Figure 3. As we found in
Experiment 1, sentences with two true clauses were overwhelmingly evaluated as
“True,” and sentences with two false clauses were again overwhelmingly evaluated
as “False.” The key difference between Experiment 2 and Experiment 1 is that we
now found sentences in the False-True condition evaluated as “True” about 50% of
the time in Experiment 2. This means that, in sentences with a false irrelevant clause
and a true relevant clause, participants were willing to disregard, or ignore, the false
information about half of the time. Note that this finding cannot be due simply to a
mismatch in truth value, as the True-False condition – in which the irrelevant clause
contained true information and the relevant clause contained false information – was
again evaluated as False overall. We see then that participants are sensitive to clausal
relevance, namely that they are willing to disregard false irrelevant information, but
are not willing to disregard false relevant information.
Importantly, we again found no difference between sentences containing apposi-
tives and sentences containing conjunctions. This means that participants overall
disregarded false irrelevant conjunct clauses at the same rate that they disregarded
false irrelevant appositive clauses. We also found again that participants were highly
confident in their decisions, as shown in Figure 4. Although there is a slight dip in the
confidence ratings of the False-True condition, the mean ratings of the condition are
still high on the scale, and we see no significant difference between the confidence
ratings of the appositive condition and the conjunction condition.4
Could the results of Experiment 2 be due to participants selectively allocating
attention to relevant portions of the sentences? That is, could participants have been
scanning the sentences in order to find the relevant information, and therefore not
fully reading or understanding the full sentences? If participants who responded
“True” in the False-True condition in Experiment 2 did so because they were not
fully reading the first clause, then we predict that participants responding “True” will
perform worse on a verbatim memory recognition test – which requires participants
to recognize material from the sentence they just read – than participants responding
“False.” Experiment 3 replicated the design of Experiment 2, but included a verbatim
memory recognition task that probed this question.
4 Experiment 3
Experiment 3 had the same design as Experiment 2; however, a verbatim memory
recognition task was included in order to test the hypothesis that participants who
responded “True” in the False-True condition in Experiment 2 were not fully reading
the sentences.
4 A maximal ordinal logistic regression model with full random effects structure showed no significant
effect of clause.
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Figure 4
Mean confidence ratings for Experiment 2 by truth value combination
and clause. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
4.1 Method
4.1.1 Participants
Forty-eight workers on Mechanical Turk participated in the experiment; all self-
identified as native English speakers. Completion of the survey took an average of
55 minutes. All participants were paid $8 for their participation.
4.1.2 Materials
The materials for Experiment 3 were the same as the materials for Experiment 2;
however, after 1/4 of the trials participants were required to answer a comprehension
question. Each participant saw 60 total comprehension questions, balanced across
all item conditions and fillers. Comprehension questions were also balanced for
truth, so that 50% of the questions were true and 50% were false. If the question was
false, it asked about a shape that was shown on the screen but was not mentioned in
the target sentence. Therefore, participants could not answer correctly based only on
what shapes were shown on the screen (as opposed to what was mentioned in the
target sentences).
Items with comprehension questions were randomly distributed throughout the
experiment, and participants did not know which trials would have questions. On
trials with comprehension questions, a screen would appear after submission of
an item’s confidence rating asking the participant to answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to a
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What color is the circle?
The circle, which is next to the brown triangle, is green.
Did the sentence mention a blue triangle?
Table 4 Example post-rating comprehension question from Experiment 3.
comprehension question about the item they just completed. An example trial is
given in Table 4.
4.2 Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 3 was identical to Experiments 1 and 2, but included
additional training and example items for the comprehension question task.
4.3 Analysis
Truth judgment results were analyzed in the same way as those for Experiment 2.
4.4 Results
Experiment 3 replicated the results of Experiment 2. As shown in Figure 5, the
False-True appositive condition sentences for both the appositive and conjunction
conditions were again judged “True” at a mean rate of about 50%. We also again
found no statistically significant difference between the appositive condition and the
conjunction condition; in each truth value combination, sentences with an appositive
first clause and sentences with a conjunct first clause patterned together.
These results were reflected in a main effect of clause 2 truth, and an interaction
of clause 1 truth and clause 2 truth (both ps < .001.). No other effects reached a
significance threshold of p < .05.
4.5 Discussion
We predicted that if participants who responded “True” in the False-True condition
did so because they were not fully reading the first clause, then those participants
would perform worse on a verbatim memory recognition task than participants who
responded “False” in the False-True condition. This hypothesis is based on the
proposal that, if participants were merely scanning the sentences for the relevant
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Figure 5
Mean percent of sentences evaluated True by truth value combina-
tion and clause in Experiment 3. Error bars indicate 95% confidence
intervals.
information to respond to the QuD, then their recognition of sentential material would
be poorer than participants who were fully reading each sentence. Figure 6 shows
the truth evaluations of participants broken down by their overall performance on the
verbatim memory task. As hypothesized, the bottom 1/3 scoring participants were
more likely to evaluate the False-True condition as “True” than the top 1/3 scoring
participants. This may appear at first glance to provide evidence for the proposal that
participants responding “True” were not fully reading the target sentences. However,
overall accuracy scores suggest that this is not the case. Overall mean (and median)
accuracy was 82% correct (sd=12%), and all participants scored above chance on
what was a challenging task. Because participants had such high accuracy overall,
it is unlikely that the findings in Experiments 2 and 3 can be explained solely by
participants not fully reading the experimental sentences.
5 General Discussion
Our initial hypothesis was that judgments of truth and falsity would be affected by
clausal type and by the relevance of propositional information to conversational
goals. Contrary to expectations, we found that judgments of truth and falsity were
not affected by clausal type: participants were not more willing to disregard false
appositives than false conjunctions in truth evaluations. However, we found that
judgments of truth and falsity were affected by the relevance of information to
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Figure 6
Mean percent of sentences evaluated True in Experiment 3 by participant
score on verbatim memory task.
conversational goals: information relevant to resolving a QuD was prioritized over
irrelevant information in evaluations of truth.
Our surprising finding is that even evaluations of conjunctions – whose semantic
truth-conditional contributions are not under debate – could be pushed around in
experimental settings. Do we want to let go of our basic beliefs about the truth
conditional contributions of conjunctions? That is, do we want to propose that the
semantic truth conditions of conjunctions are sensitive to clausal relevance? We
argue that we do not. Therefore, we should take seriously the claim that experimental
investigations of truth can tell us something about language. But, we should be
cautious in how we argue from experimental results to theoretical implications.
What can we conclude, then, from our experimental findings here, and from
experimental investigations of truth more generally? First, our findings reinforce the
idea that there is no strict mapping from speaker evaluations of truth to semantic
truth. Results of this nature do tell us when people in a particular situation are
willing to apply the predicate ‘true’ to a sentence. Experimental investigations of
truth such as those presented here also provide insight into how judgments of truth
can be modulated by top-down, goal-driven behavior (see also von Fintel 2004 and
Abrusán & Szendro˝i 2013).
Finally, we conclude by restating what these results can and cannot tell us about
appositives. Our results suggest that appositives contribute to evaluations of truth at
the level of the discourse. Our results do not, however, adjudicate between theories
about the semantic, truth-conditional contribution of appositives to their containing
sentence. The relevance of the experimental results of truth-evaluation studies to
semantic theory remains an open question.
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